- 1. Introduction:
Geo-economics, geopolitics and "new wars" - 3. The fossil energy
regime - 4. Limits of Resources
and their oligarchical distribution - 5. Peakoil and climate
conflicts - 6. Oil
Imperialism - 7. A "solar revolution":
the transition to a renewable energy regime - Nota
Abstract
The discourse on globalisation was dominant during the
1990s, and therefore also the emphasis on the role of free global
markets and geo-economic competition. Latest after September 2001
geo-politics came back in, based on US-american unilateralism and
the use of political pressure and military power. The geoeconomic
and geo-political discourses complete each other and they are the
background of the cooperation of neo-liberals and
neo-conservatives. Economc competitiveness as well as political
power are highly dependent on the secure provision of resources,
especially of oil. Oil is fuelling capitalist accumulation and
growth. Capitalism and fossilism are congruent and thus determine
the societal relation of mankind to nature. However, oil is a
finite resource, it is running out. Oil production very soon will
peak, but oil demand will increase because of the pressures
exerted by financial markets and by international institutions,
such as the WTO or the IMF. Therefore conflicts about access to oil
are likely to aggravate. Oil-imperialism of the powerful nations
is becoming the modern manifestation of geopolitics. It contains
political and military action as well as the influence on markets
(on demand and supply, on prices and the "oil-currency"). It is
only possible to stop oil-imperialism by an organised
decomposition of the congruence of capitalism and fossilism, by
initiating the transition to a regime of renewable resources.
This means that capitalism as we know it will come to an
end.
Descriptores Tematicos: Globalizacion; Neoliberalismo; Capitalismo;
Petroleo; Recursos
Petroliferos; Geopolitica;
Imperialismo;
Recursos
Naturales; Desarrollo
Sustentable; Militarismo
1. Introduction:
Geo-economics, geopolitics and "new wars"
After the demise of the socialist camp at the beginnings
of the 1990s Edward Luttwak (1994) or Kenichi Ohmae (1992) have
been the most prominent proponents of the idea of an era of an
emerging geo-economic world order, based on economic competition
on global markets instead of political conflicts within and
between nation-states. The binary logics of political hostility
are presumed to be transformed into the peaceful rules of a (by
definition) era of multilateral economic competition and
cooperation. According to the line of argument of the
free-tradediscourse, the wealth of nations will in consequence
increase. Globalisation thus is a blessing for
mankind.
In the meanwhile, however, and especially since
September 11, 2001, there has been a reemergence of the
"geopolitical" or geostrategic binary interpretation of the world
as divided between allied friendly nations and hostile enemies,
against whom war must be waged and this view has been
especially strongly advanced by the Bush administration. It is
not only neo-conservative or neo-liberal ideology which guides
the US-government to follow the path of a "unipolar moment"
announced by Charles Krauthammer already 1991 immediately after
the end of the Soviet block, instead of the presumed
multilaterialism of globalisation. The war against terrorism is
only one war among many others which characterize the "new world
order". The peaceful velvet revolution only was an historical
intermezzo; it has been followed by many violent conflicts in all
parts of the world. Those social scientists whose profession is
to count the number of wars, find out that due to the failure of
state building and because of the disappearance of the protection
of one of the bipolar superpowers the number of extra-state,
sub-state or civil wars increased remarkably. Under this
perspective, the new world order is a new world disorder. The
disorder, however, has economic, political, social causes. It is
the result of the impact of geopolitical interests of the
superpower which are dictating the agenda. The agenda is labelled
national security, and one crucial part of it (besides security
against migrants, organized crime, prostitution or drug
trafficking) is the secure provision of strategic resources, such
as petroleum, uranium and other minerals or agricultural
resources (US National Security Strategy of 2002; Cheney Report
of 2001). How important is it for the geopolitical stance of the
USA that leading figures such as Cheney, Rice and Rumsfeld, and
many others, including Bush himself, have strong ties to the
California-Texas – oil industry? Is the Bush administration
driven by a Wall Street-military-CalTexcomplex?
After less than a decade the geo-economic discourse of
globalization has been completed by a geopolitical discourse of
global power. But there is a difference to the "old" geopolitical
reasoning of the early 20th century. In the understanding of
Haushofer or Kjellén geopolitics always included an
organic "growth of the nation state" because they assumed that
without growth the nation state will die. This assumption is not
the basis of modern geopolitical reasoning. Geopolitics today
includes the efforts of extending rules (of "global and good
governance") on all parts of the world in order to oblige
governments as well as private actors to follow the same set of
rules which allow exploitation of resources of manpower as
well as of natural resources by the powerful actors on the stage
of the global theatre. Once the rules are established it is
possible to leave the allocation of resources to the market.
Therefore, the strongest, the fittest, the most competitive
actors have the best chances in the game over exploitation of
resources. Modern geopolitcs, therefore, always comes accompanied
by geo-economics. The latter is the theme of free trade
ideologues, of neoliberal marketers and their think tanks, of
liberal and conservative parties and governments. The former is
the case of geo-politicians, of neo-conservatives, and in many
cases the free marketers and geopoliticians and their manifestos
are the result of the same think tank. They work perfectly
together in organizing the "grand chessboard" of
exploitation of resources at the beginning of the 21st
century.
The following account above all deals with the energy
requirements for capital
accumulation. The access to energy
resources always has been a major cause of conflict and violence.
The dynamics of capitalism are the outcome of science and
technology, of the social form of surplus value production, and
last not least – of the massive use of fossil fuels. Fossil
resources, however, are limited and their use involves extremely
harmful effects on the global environment (above all the
greenhouse effect). As we are approaching the limits of the
provision of fossil resources und thus the end of the fossil
energy regime, there are increasingly sharp conflicts about
access to resources, as well as conflicts resulting from the
ecological degradation of large territories. The dimensions of
these conflicts are manifold. They take the form of conflicts
over trade, or they appear as diplomatic pressures and political
and even military intervention. Attempts are undertaken to
resolve conflicts within a framework of international agreements,
but this framework more and more is unilaterally manipulated by
the leading capitalist powers. Conflicts about oil have led to
open wars, waged by the "only superpower" against Afghanistan and
Iraq, although
in the Bushian newspeak this military aggression has been
labelled as a war waged on international terrorism. But also the
wars in Sudan, Congo, Columbia etc. are neither ethnical
conflicts nor the outcome of a powerplay between competing
elites. They are waged on the domination of resource-rich
territories. Very often external actors, such as TNCs and private
"security-suppliers" are involved.
2. Growth fuelled by fossil
energy
Without a continuous supply and massive use of fossil
energies modern capitalism would be locked into the boundaries of
biotic energies (wind, water, bio-masses, the power of muscles
etc.). Although capitalist social forms had already put down some
weak roots in ancient societies (in Europe as well as in Latin
America and Asia), these
could not flourish because of an insufficient technological basis
and because of the lack of fossil energy. The economy was
restricted by reliance on "slow" biotic energies which did not
allow a capitalist acceleration of production, i.e. a decisive
increase of productivity in the production of relative surplus
value. Therefore also growth was limited, and in fact the average
growth rate was nearly zero before the industrial revolution of
late 18th century. Conversely, fossil energy would not have
played the decisive role which it has done since the industrial
revolution without the social formation of capitalism and its
all-encompassing dynamics. Three forces drove the since then
highly dynamic development: (1) the "European rationality of
world domination" (as Max Weber
called it), (2) the dynamics of money in the social form of
capital (as Marx analysed it)
and (3) the use of fossil energies which became the fulfilment of
a (by Nicolas GeorgescuRoegen) so called "promethean revolution",
comparable to the Neolithic revolution several thousand years
ago, when mankind discovered how systematically to transform
solar energy into crops etc. by establishing sedentary
agricultural systems. The development of agriculture resulted in
an increase of food production, and moreover in a greater
relability of food supplies. The surplus produced by the farmers
in the terminology of the "Physiocrats" of the 18th
century, the sole "productive class" – made it possible that
"unproductive classes" of artisans, clerks and rulers could be
fed. The division of labour within society included a division of
labour between the urban and rural areas, between the sexes,
between intellectual and manual labour,
and between the rulers und the ruled.
The industrial revolution was even more radical, because
of the acceleration of all economic and social processes since
then. World population has increased faster than ever before. In
pre-capitalist and pre-industrial times economic growth was
dependent on population growth which, in turn, depended
this was the rationale behind Malthus' theory on the supply
of goods and services for subsistence and reproduction. But since
the industrial revolution economic growth became independent on
population growth due to an enormous productivity increase and
the concomitant increase of the production of relative surplus
value. Therefore, contrary to Malthus predictions per capita
incomes also increased. Angus Maddison in an OECD study showed
that in the first millennium after Christ, from 0 to 1000 AD,
world population grew at an average annual rate of 0,02% from
230,8 million to 268,3 million. Between 1000 to 1820 the number
increased to 1041,1 million. GDP per capita followed a similar
trend: in the first millennium from 0 to 1000 AD there was a
slight decrease from an average of $444 to $435 per person per
year (in the 1990 equivalent dollar standard which Maddison
uses). And between 1000 AD to 1820 an increase to $667 per capita
took place. It is interesting to note that in the first
millennium the income divergences between Western Europe, Japan,
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia
were very small. Per capita income at the end of the first
millennium varied between a low of $400 dollar (Western Europe)
to a high of $450 in Asia (excluding Japan). In the second
millennium, however, the divergence of per capita incomes
increased remarkably. In 1820 the average per capita income in
Western Europe reached $1232; in Africa it was the same as 820
years before: $418 (Maddison 2001: 28). Maddison, of course, is
aware of the methodological problems measuring monetary flows
over 2000 years in 1990 dollar-denomination. Therefore the
interpretation must be more careful than usual. Although the
numbers are not fully reliable, the trend found out is
plausible.
From the second half of the 19th century average growth
rates increased remarkably. This growth, however, has been
extremely uneven over time and in space, and has failed to reduce
the inequalities between peoples and regions in a globalizing
world. This is also evident in the numbers provided by Maddison.
Average world per capita income increased from 1820 to 1998, i.e.
in only 178 years from $667 to $5709 (in Maddison's 1990
international dollar standard). The distribution of incomes in
the same period became more uneven. In 1998 average per capita
income in Western Europe was $17921, in North America (USA,
Canada etc.)
it was $26146 dollars, in Asia (excluding Japan) it was $2936 and
in Africa $1368 (Maddison 2001: 28).
No wonder, that in the 20th century economic growth has
become a kind of a fetish, not only in economic theory but also
in political discourses, world-wide. Interestingly classical
political economy, whose founders still were living in an
predominantly agrarian environment, established only the
foundations of a theory of growth, but they did not develop the
theory. In the contrary some of the classical political
economists praised the virtues of self-sufficiency and a
contemplative life e.g. John Stuart Mill. Only in the 20th
century did economic growth become seen as the most important
goal of economic activity, a decisive benchmark of "good"
governance. Growth and growth theory first became a central
concern in the planning processes in the socialist Soviet Union.
It then became the dominant economic discourse in the course of
the competition between the two systems and with the development
of Keynesian economics.
The transition to industrial systems is much more
dramatic than that which transformed societies of hunters and
gatherers into a social order of sedentary agricultural systems.
For now it is no longer the flow of solar radiation which serves
as the main energy supply for the system of production, but the
use of the mineralised stocks of energy in the crust of the
earth. The greatest expansion of human demand for natural
resources followed the Industrial Revolution during the latter
half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. The
Neolithic revolution, however, is an important example which
shows that it is possible to extremely increase the productivity
of labour and of resources on the basis of the solar
energy-regime. Therefore, a similar increase after the transition
to a "solar society" cannot be excluded.
One of the main advantages of fossil (and nuclear)
energies for capitalist accumulation in comparison with other
energies is the congruence of their physical properties with the
socioeconomic and political logics of capitalist
development.
- Firstly, they can be used without considering space
and place. The location of energy resources is no longer the
main reason for the location of industries, for it is simple to
transport energy resources to any place in the world. The
fossil energy system spreads itself far and wide by creating
logistical networks which today cover the globe. It is so to
say "autopoetic", for it allows the transport of energy to
remote places of the Earth and thus draws them into the fossil
system. Energy supply therefore is only one factor amongst many
others in decisions about where production is to take place.
The availability of local sources of energy has only a minor
impact on the competition for locations in the global
space. - Secondly, and in contrast to solar radiation, which
changes its intensity between day and night, summer and winter,
and with the rhythms of the seasons, fossil energies can be
used 24 hours a day and 365 days a year with constant
intensity. They allow the organisation of production processes
independently of social time schedules, biological and other
natural rhythms. The time regime of modernity follows the
logics of profitability and shareholder value. The reason is
that fossil energies can be stored and consumed without
reference to natural time patterns, and only in accordance with
the timetable which will optimise profits. "Time is money"
therefore appears not as a crazy statement but as an adequate
norm for human behaviour in "modern times - Thirdly, fossil energies allow the extreme
acceleration of processes, i.e. the "compression of time and
space" (Harvey 1999; Altvater and Mahnkopf 1999). In other
words they allow an increase in productivity i.e. the
production of more commodities within a given time span or the
reduction of the time span for the production of the same
amount of products. Since time and space are the coordinates of
nature in which we live, their compression is a serious neglect
of the natural conditions of work and life. · Fourthly,
fossil energies can be used very flexibly with regard to the
quantities of energy consumed or the temporal distribution and
spatial location of consumption. The development of electricity
networks and of the electro-motor, the
illumination of whole cities at night, of the gasoline and
diesel-motor are decisive steps for an increasingly flexible
use of energy-inputs, for the mobilisation and acceleration of
economic processes and for an individualisation of social life
which never before in human history existed. Now, managerial
decisions can follow the logics of profitability for capitalist
firms without needing to take into account energy restrictions
or spatial and temporal constraints. Therefore, accumulation
and growth must be understood as increasingly independent from
natural conditions and their limitations.
These advantages of fossil energy for the capitalist
system make them indispensable for its functioning. The
congruence of capitalism, fossilism, rationalism and
industrialism is perfect and make it a comprehensive fossil
energy regime which includes not only the fossil resources and
the economic mechanisms of growth and accumulation, but also the
formation of social relations based on the massive use of fossil
energy and of a fossil culture, most visible in the dominance of
automobiles in modern societies. The concept of growth is the
most unchallenged one in economics. Politicians from the IMF to
local governments unite in praising the God of growth, seen as
the solution to all the problems of the world the magic
cure for unemployment, for poverty, for underdevelopment, for the
fiscal
crisis of the
state, etc. Of course, real growth of output enlarges the
increase available for distribution, and therefore it makes life
easier for governments. But the question comes up: is growth
possible for ever, is growth "triumphant" (Easterlin 1998)? And
the answer has to be no, because nothing on earth grows eternally
without any limits. The limits of growth belong to the life
conditions, to the laws of evolution on the planet Earth, and
they are a direct consequence of the limits of fossil resources
which are fuelling the growth-engine.
Although the "capitalist growth machine" is nearly
entirely powered by fossil energy (and thus dependent on a closed
system of finite resources) human and natural life in general is
almost entirely dependent on solar radiation (i.e. on the influx
of solar energy into an open system). Daylight, the warming of
the atmosphere, of the waters and the soils, the growth of living
beings, the provision of food, etc. are the result of solar
radiation and only to a small extent that of the use of fossil
energy consumption. The satisfaction of primary human needs only
is possible by using energy in the form of organic foods
(containing proteins, fats, carbohydrates, vitamins, and
minerals; water) and in a transformed manner as clothing and
shelter – not to speak about the availability of
oxygen.
This contradiction between life conditions (open system)
and economic conditions (closed system) on Earth is a decisive
one. Capitalism, i.e. social actors within the capitalist system,
have constructed a "firewall"
between them. Today, and possibly never, it is impossible to
power the machine of capitalist accumulation and growth with
solar radiation. It simply has not the advantages mentioned
above, i.e. the potential of time and space compression, which
fossil energy offers. Conversely, the fossil energy regime of the
capitalist economy has an extremely destructive effect on living
conditions on Earth, i.e. on life which is "powered" nearly
completely by solar radiation. The degradation of nature, e.g.
the greenhouse effect, ozone layer depletion, loss of
biodiversity, desertification, disappearance of tropical rain
forests etc. the impact of these forms of ecological
devastation have become dramatically evident and the focus of
deep concern among ecological researchers and campaigners. The
advantages of the fossil energy regime have a price: the
disadvantages of ecological destruction and of the necessity to
find a solution to the limits of their availability.
4. Limits of Resources
and their oligarchical distribution
Generally, capitalist production does not care about
natural or social limits. Nature is external to capitalist
accumulation, and therefore the inevitable effects of joint
production (each production is joint production, as thermodynamic
economics convincingly show) on the natural environment in
mainstream economics are interpreted as "external effects". Gold
is a telling example for the abstraction of economics from
natural boundaries. Gold is, by its very nature, a limited
resource, although socially and economically it functions as
money. Since capitalist accumulation is ignoring natural
boundaries and money is a social construct, the function of money
has been de-coupled from the natural form of limited gold and
ascribed to paper-money or electronic bits and bytes. Money in a
nature-form nearly completely disappeared. Attempts to revive
gold as the natural form of money, as Jaques Rueff tried to do
under de Gaulle in the 1960s, is a ridiculous and anachronistic
undertaking.
In capitalist calculation ecological limits of
production and accumulation are recognised only when they
increase the costs of economic processes and exert pressures on
the rate of profit. Calculations of the German Institute for
Economic Research have shown that the annual costs of climate
change will be the equivalent of about $2000bn from the middle of
the century on (Kemfert 2004). "External effects" of production
and consumption on society and nature are irrelevant for
capitalist rational choices so long as they remain external. But
this is the case only so long as the "carrying capacity" and the
capacities of recreation of nature and social systems are
sufficient as to bear the emissions of the economic process.
Otherwise they become part of the "general conditions of
production", affect negatively profitability and accumulation up
to a crisis of the capitalist system. (This is the theme of James
O'Connor, David Harvey and others.)
In the case of oil, however, it is impossible to neglect
natural properties and boundaries of the resource; bits and bytes
cannot substitute for oil. The stocks of oil are limited, and oil
will be running out over the next few decades. Although the
supply of oil is limited, the demand for oil will increase in
spite of the attempts to save energy and to increase the
efficiency of its use. This is for two interconnected reasons.
First, the "financialisation" of global capitalism and the
crucial role of financial markets with its high real interest
rates and rates of return-claims, enforce high real growth rates
of GNP. Under the prevailing patterns of technology deployment,
growth only can be achieved by an intensive use of fossil energy.
Thus the operation of global financial markets has an impact on
the oil market. It only can be mentioned here that there are also
two other pressures exerted by the financial system on quantities
and prices of supply on world oil markets. One arises from
speculation on futures markets. The other is due to the fact that
rich oil producers of the Gulf region have heavily invested their
"petrodollars" into financial assets so that their income in the
meanwhile is as dependent on interest flows as on oil rents. The
second reason stems from the globalization of Western production
and consumption patterns which are extremely energy-intensive.
Newly industrialising countries crowd into markets and add to the
already insatiable demand of the OECD countries, above all of the
USA.
The limits involved become even more evident when we
consider not just the "input-side" of the fossil regime but also
the "output-side", i.e. the emissions of CO2 and other
pollutants. The greenhouse gases build up
in the atmosphere and thus reduce levels of heat-radiation from
the Earth into outer space. The average temperature on Earth is
likely to rise in the next decades. Although today the likely
effects can be no more than predictions, most scenarios of the
forthcoming climate change show a severely negative impact on
natural and social systems. The number, force and impact of
unusual weather- and climate events are increasing. The
hurricanes Katrina and Rita are an actual example for the
destructive power of a natural environment which has lost its
ecological balance.
In all parts of the world, including huge countries like
China and
India, there
is a continuing shift into industry from agriculture (which is
more dependent on renewable, solar energy than industrial
systems), and a movement of population from the countryside to
urban agglomerations. These trends are powerfully accelerated by
the rules of the game as implemented by international
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, with their
structural adjustment plans, or the WTO which exerts pressure on
all member countries to increase competitiveness in global
competition. Economic mechanisms, supported by political
pressures transplant the limits of energy supply into the working
of the global accumulation process. The limits of resources on
the background of increasing demand are responsible for higher
conflictuality between political and economic actors. Under
"normal" conditions capitalist accumulation relied on the
production of relative surplus value, on productivity increases,
powered by fossil fuel.
Under the conditions of energy shortage and increasing
energy prices accumulation of capital more and more takes the
form of a process of dispossession (Harvey; de Angeles) of the
less powerful by the more powerful private corporations and
national states. The "oil security" of different countries and
alliances is competitive and conflict-prone. The transformation
of natural riches (matter and energy) into the wealth of nations
is not possible for all people in the world. The "wealth of
nations" is a "positional" or oligarchical or club-good for the
few belonging to the club or to the global oligarchy and not for
all the others.
5. Peakoil and climate
conflicts
The main limiting factor of accumulation is the
exhaustion of non-renewable fossil energy-resources within a
reasonable time-span. Of course, the capitalist crisis is the
consequence of the internal socio-economic contradictions of
capital and labour and thus to some extent independent of the
availability of resources. External limits, however, have the
potential to aggravate "normal" capitalist crises. In times of
mass unemployment labour is no limiting factor at all, and
technology neither. Nature in general is a limiting factor,
because the carrying capacity of eco-systems cannot be stretched
together with the load of human activities on natural sinks.
Nobody knows exactly when oil and gas fields will
be dry and empty, but it is certain that this will happen not in
centuries but in a few years or decades from now. Oil production
probably is peaking soon, Deffeyes writes around thanksgiving day
2005. Moreover, the exploitation of known reserves becomes more
and more expensive since pressure and viscosity and other
physical properties of oil fields deteriorate in the course of
the extraction. Drilling is becoming more and more complicated,
especially in off-shore areas or in the case of unconventional
oil-fields.
The peak of oil production was already predicted by
Marion King Hubbert in the 1950s, when everybody believed in an
abundance of oil. But oil production must inevitably decline
given that the additional reserves being found each year are
smaller than the total of oil extracted, indicating that when oil
production has passed its peak. The peak, however, is not an
objective fact, but is dependent on extractiontechnologies and on
the evaluation of reserves. The first factor is emphasised by
neoclassical economists: Do invest capital into the exploration
of oil fields and into oil logistics and refinement – and the
supply of oil can be increased in pace with the growing demand.
The second factor, the evaluations of reserves is highly
dependent on interests of all parties involved in oil markets:
producers, consumers and dealers. Therefore the estimates of
world reserves are substantially different, reaching from 1149 bn
barrels (BP in 2003) to 780 bn barrels (ASPO). The data published
by BP are based on information provided by private oil
companies.
These data are biased by the strategies deployed by the
companies concerned. The case of Shell in 2004 is telling. The
company had to reduce their published highly overvalued reserve
figures by 3,9 bn barrels, i.e. by more than 20 percent due to
the requirements of stock market supervision. A major reason of
this "error" and its corrections is "creative book-keeping". The
company blew the reserves out for their annual report, in order
to facelift the financial performance. OPEC countries for their
part are interested in high reserve-figures because of two
reasons. First, oil producers increase their estimate of reserves
in order to get a higher OPEC quota in oil production. Typically,
during the late 1980s "six of the 11 OPEC nations increased their
reserve figures by colossal amounts, ranging from 42 to 197
percent, they did so only to boost their export quotas."
(Campbell/ Laherrere 1998; available under ).
The Iraq reported in 1983 (during the war against Iran) an
increase of reserves of 11 giga barrels although there was no
discovery of new fields. Also Kuwait notified an increase of its
reserves in 1985 of 50% without any proof. The second reason for
reports of high reserves is the intention to influence the
consumers of oil. High reserves of oil producing countries signal
that also in the future there will be no shortage of oil and
therefore the search of alternatives (of renewable energies) is
not necessary. On the other hand the reserves may be
underestimated in order to increase the hidden reserves of an oil
company or to inflate the oil-price in order to make the
exploration of unconventional oil (deep sea-oil; oil-sand; polar
oil, heavy oil) and high investment into new infrastructure
(pipelines, tankers, refineries etc.) profitable. The uncertainty
about the real amount of reserves therefore is remarkably high,
as the comparison between the reserve figures of BP and ASPO
perspicuously show. But it is absolutely certain that the reserve
stocks are declining.
One major result of the using up of fossil energy is an
enormous increase in greenhouse gas emissions and hence the
warming of the atmosphere. According to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001), the average global
temperature has risen by approximately 0.6°C during the 20th
century. The average surface air temperature is expected to rise
0.4 to 5.8°C by 2100 relative to 1990, and the sea level is
projected to rise 0.09 to 0.88 m by the same year. However, these
data in the meanwhile are challenged by new measures of the
increase of the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. In recent
years much scientific progress has been made in realistically
assessing the effects of an increase of world temperature on the
sea level, coastal areas, small and low islands, desertification,
on changes of agricultural climate zones, and on biodiversity,
although the totality of climate-effects of the combustion of
fossil energies is still uncertain. However, only a few studies
suggest that climate change will have no negative effects; most
studies forecast severe consequences and a dramatic deterioration
of future living conditions on earth.
The consequences of global warming are serious even
today. The number of weather- and climate-related disasters in
the world has more than tripled in the last decade compared to
the 1960s. The average cost in recent decades is estimated at
around $334 billion per decade, as the insurance-industry
complains. For the future a calculation of the German Institute
for Economic Research estimates an annual cost of up to $2000
billion. (Hemfert 2004).
At the end of the fossil energy regime conflicts are
becoming sharper, on the input side with regard to access to oil
resources as well as on the output side with regard to
environmental consequences of petrol-combustion. Each nation,
constrained by the logics of industrial and post-industrial
capitalism, needs to have access to the common good of fossil
fuel reserves. But under the conditions of scarcity (better:
shortage) the global commons of oil reserves is (as we have
already seen) transformed into a "positional", oligarcical or
"club" good. Either its distribution can be left to market forces
and the processes of price formation, so that those oil consumers
which do not afford to pay for the oil invoices are prevented
from access. Or it could be organized in a democratic, solidary
rationing of oil reserves a perspective which however in these
times is not realistic. The third mode of distributing oil
resources is that of the exercise of political power and military
violence. It is rather likely that the first and the third mode
and a mixture between both will rule the "Great Game", the battle
over control of scarce
oil resources in the coming future. These are the forces at play
in the new "petrostrategy", in the arising oil-imperialism, in
which geo-economics and geopolitics are combined.
The combination of market forces and (military) power is
central in the ideologies of American neo-conservatives the
neo-liberal glorification of a free market in a "geo-economy" and
a "geo-political" recourse to military power. The invisible hand
of the market must be completed by the visible fist of the
American army, in the cynical words of Thomas Friedman. This is
only at the first glance a contradictory position, considered
more closely, it refers to a long tradition of "oilempire".
American wealth, power and supremacy are founded on "cheap and
abundant oil flows" (Klare 2004) from the 19th century and the
Rockefeller-Bakuconnection until the present days.
"Oil security" is one of the priorities of US-American
politics (Cheney report 2001; Klare 2004). It refers to several
dimensions: first, to strategic control of oil territories;
secondly, to the strategic control of oil logistics (pipe lines,
routes of oil tank-ships, secure refineries and storage);
thirdly, it aims to influence the formation of the oilprice by
controlling supply and demand; and fourthly, it aims to determine
the currency in which the price of oil is invoiced. When we
consider the many complex strands in a strategy of oil security
or "oil imperialism", the formula of "blood for oil" seems too
simple. Yet it is essentially correct.
The US govenment aims to secure strategic control over
oil regions, either by means of diplomacy and the establishment
of friendly relations as in the Gulf region, or by means of
subversion as in some Latin American and African countries, or by
using massive military power as in Iraq and to a lesser extent
also in Central Asia. The war waged on Iraq seems to be an
irrational undertaking, because a military occupation imposed on
a country against the resistance of a hostile population is
extremely expensive and, in ways which are difficult to estimate,
may well involve a demoralising impact on hegemony of the global
superpower. Nevertheless, the USA after 2001 are well prepared to
control the oilregions; they dispose on more than 700 military
bases in all parts of the world, many of them aiming at
controlling the Caucasus Region, Central Asia and the
Gulf.
The strategic control of oil logistics is expensive too,
although to a lesser extent. It requires the collaboration of
many governments in countries traversed by the pipelines, and the
countries along whose coasts the tankers are routed and need
protection. In Central Asia the US have created what is sometimes
designated as "Pipelineistan", the group of states in the region
which provides transit for the Caspian oil. Based as it is on
authoritarian and corrupt regimes, US dominance over these stages
is however precarious, and faces challenge, not only by
"terrorists", but by considerable parts of the
population.
Influence on the supply of oil can only be exercised by
influencing OPEC, or by using diplomatic pressure on single oil
producers, or by enforcing oil exploration in parts of the world
which so far have not fully become incorporated into the US
oilempire. The occupation of Iraq, and the establishment of a
US-dependent and therefore only formally sovereign government,
allow the USA to exert some influence on OPEC decisions since
Iraq is a member country. Diplomatic pressure on oil producers
(particularly swing producers like Saudi Arabia, to get them to
increase their exports is a very common practice of rich oil
consuming countries and not only of the USA.
In 1973 the US dollar fell shaply against other
currencies and the inflation rate in the USA increased. Faced
with this situation, the oil exporting countries had only one
alternative. No other currency was available, apart from the US
dollar, in which oil could be priced. What they were able to do
was to exploit the opportunity of the Israeli-Arab Yom Kippur war
of October 1973 to increase the oil price. This increase was
experienced as a severe "shock" by oil importing countries.
Thirty years later, however, the situation has changed, because
an alternative currency exists, namley the Euro. But in June 2003
the OPEC decided to continue to invoice in US dollars, although
some governments already considered to switch into the
Euro, above all Venezuela and
the Iraq before the war. The domination of all the other
dimensions of "oil governance" by the USA makes sure that no
change of the oil currency in the near future is going to take
place. However, it is not certain that this favourable situation
for the USA will last for ever. The loss of value of the US
dollar vis-à-vis the Euro and the huge twin deficits being
run by the US economy (on trade and the federal budget) are
factors which make the Euro as a oil currency more attractive for
oil exporters.
Moreover, this option could also become attractive for
those countries, particularly Japan and China, much of whose huge
official reserves consist of US financial assets. Again we have
to consider the close connectedness of financial and oil markets.
According to the Economist (January 10, 2004) at the end of 2003
Japan held reserves totalling $673,5 bn, China $406,0 bn,
Hongkong $114,1 bn, South Korea $150,3 bn, and Taiwan $206,3 bn.
There is the threatening possibility that these reserves would
lose part of their value in the event of a devaluation of the US
dollar. Such a devaluation is a real possibility. The strategy of
these countries will be to change their reserves into alternative
currencies, above all into the Euro. They must do it slowly in
order to avoid turbulences on currency markets. Senior officials
of the People's Bank of China have in fact declared their
intention to increase the share of the Euro in its reserves. Also
the Bank of South Korea declared the intention to reduce the
engagement in US-Dollars. However, the share of the Euro in the
reserves of the Asian central banks today is only 6%, so that the
degree of movement into the Euro should not be overstated (Solans
2004: 12). Again, we have to take into account the intertwined
structures of global oil and global finance. Therefore, a
strategy which aims to prevent resulting conflicts must include
both, regulation of the oil market as well as the re-regulation
of global financial markets.
The conflict over oil therefore has many dimensions. On
the horizon of the disputes on energy security, i.e. on oil,
there hovers the possibility of deep tensions between the US
dollar and the Euro, between North America and Europe. Oil
imperialism obviously includes conflict dimensions which have the
potential to undermine any peaceful co-existence between the
peoples of the world. On the output-side oil imperialism also is
topical. One of the worst scenarios of climate change,
paradoxically, has been presented in a study commissioned by the
Pentagon and carried out by Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall
(2003) of the Global Business Network. Since global warming does
not have equal effects in all parts of the world, the regions of
the world may be affected differently, and thus will experience
different patterns of climate change. Thus, some regions may well
be hit by colder periods in the near future because of the
changing pattern of global air and water circulation. The study
follows the assumption of the IPCC that the average global
temperature is likely to increase by up to 5.80 C by 2100. As
this temperature rise will cause a melting of the Greenland ice
sheet, the Gulf Stream may change its direction due to the lower
density and salination of waters in the North Atlantic. This
process is expected to be very rapid. The resulting collapse of
the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic will involve
"disrupting the temperate climate of Europe …. Ocean
circulation patterns change, bringing less warm water north and
causing an immediate shift in the weather in Northern Europe and
eastern North America…." (Schwartz and Randall 2003: 9). Europe
would be severely affected by such an abrupt climate change;
"…Over time though, conflicts over land and water use are
likely to become more severe –and more violent. As states
become increasingly desperate, the pressure for action will
grow." (Ibid.: 16)
Even if climate change turns out to be less dramatic as
this suggests, and does not occur as suddenly as assumed in the
Pentagon scenario (this being the opinion of the majority of
climate researchers), it is obvious how conflict-prone the use of
fossil energies actually is both on the "input side" of
energy provision and the "output side" of green house gas
emissions. The future conflicts very likely will have to do with
access to resources and with the strategies undertaken to
insulate nation states against the effects of climate change,
especially against migration flows.
7. A "solar revolution":
the transition to a renewable energy
regime
It is unlikely that new reserves of oil explored can
hold pace with the growing demand for oil. China and India alone
are responsible for three quarters of the rise in oil demand in
2004. It is unlikely that this situation will change. There seems
in fact to be only one realistic alternative to oil imerialism
namely a shift from oil dependence to renewable energy
source, to the radiation energy of the sun (and its secondary
derivatives such as photovoltaic, eolic, water, biotic energies
etc.). Technologies and appropriate social institutions have to
be developed in order to realise the necessary transformation and
to overcome the above mentioned "firewall" in energy which
separates the (closed) fossil regime from the (open) life
energies provided by the sun. This radical transition from fossil
to renewable energies can be understood as a "solar revolution".
Such a revolution must aim not just at a simple seizure of power
but must include radical transformation in patterns of production
and consumption, of life and work, of gender relations, of the
societal relation of mankind to nature. It is a holistic
endeavour.
Geopolitics, strategic resources and sustainable
development. En publicacion: Alternativas á
globalização: pôtencias emergentes e os novos
caminhos da modernidade. Elmar Altvater UNESCO, Organización de las Naciones Unidas
para la
Educación, la Ciencia y
la Cltura. 2005.
Acceso al texto
completo:
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/reggen/pp10.pdf
Este texto se encuentra bajo licencia Creative
Commons
Elmar Altvater